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Abstract
IMPORTANCE Digital contact tracing (DCT) apps have been released in several countries to help
interrupt SARS-CoV-2 transmission chains. However, the effect of DCT on pandemic mitigation
remains to be demonstrated.
OBJECTIVE To estimate key populations and performance indicators along the exposure
notification cascade of the SwissCovid DCT app in a clearly defined regional and temporal context.
DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This comparative effectiveness study was based on a
simulation informed by measured data from issued quarantine recommendations and positive SARS-
CoV-2 test results after DCT exposure notifications in the canton of Zurich. A stochastic model was
developed to re-create the DCT notification cascade for Zurich. Population sizes at each cascade step
were estimated using triangulation based on publicly available administrative and observational
research data for the study duration from September 1 to October 31, 2020. The resultant estimates
were checked for internal consistency and consistency with upstream or downstream estimates in
the cascade. Stochastic sampling from data-informed parameter distributions was performed to
explore the robustness of results. Subsequently, key performance indicators were evaluated to
assess the potential contribution of DCT compared with manual contact tracing.
MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Receiving a voluntary quarantine recommendation and/or a
positive SARS-CoV-2 test result after exposure notification.
RESULTS In September 2020, 537 app users received a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result in Zurich,
324 of whom received and entered an upload authorization code. This code triggered an app
notification for an estimated 1374 (95% simulation interval [SI], 932-2586) proximity contacts and
led to 722 information hotline calls, with an estimated 170 callers (95% SI, 154-186) receiving a
quarantine recommendation. An estimated 939 (95% SI, 720-1127) notified app users underwent
testing for SARS-CoV-2, of whom 30 (95% SI, 23-36) had positive results after an app notification.
Key indicator evaluations revealed that the DCT app triggered quarantine recommendations for the
equivalent of 5% of all exposed contacts placed in quarantine by manual contact tracing. For every
10.9 (95% SI, 7.6-15.6) upload authorization codes entered in the app, 1 contact had positive test
results for SARS-CoV-2 after app notification. Longitudinal indicator analyses demonstrated
bottlenecks in the notification cascade, because capacity limits were reached owing to an increased
incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in October 2020.
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE In this simulation study of the notification cascade of the
SwissCovid DCT app, receipt of exposure notifications was associated with quarantine
recommendations and identification of SARS-CoV-2–positive cases. These findings in notified
proximity contacts reflect important intermediary steps toward transmission prevention.
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Key Points
Question What is the possible
contribution of digital contact tracing
(DCT) apps to the interruption of SARS-
CoV-2 transmission chains?
Findings This comparative
effectiveness study found that the
number of DCT app users receiving a
quarantine recommendation
corresponded to the equivalent of as
many as 5% of all mandatory
quarantined contacts identified by
manual contact tracing in the canton of
Zurich, Switzerland. Furthermore,
approximately 1 in 11 notification triggers
led to SARS-CoV-2 testing of an exposed
proximity contact who subsequently
had positive test results.
Meaning These findings suggest that
DCT apps can make a relevant
contribution to transmission prevention,
with the potential to scale as more
persons use the apps.
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Introduction
Switzerland was one of the first countries worldwide to release a digital contact tracing (DCT) app to
complement manual contact tracing (MCT) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1,2 Digital contact
tracing apps in many countries, including Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, follow the decentralized,
privacy-preserving proximity-tracing blueprint (DP-3T) described by Troncoso et al.3 The DP-3T–
based apps send out Bluetooth low-energy beacons (Bluetooth SIG) that include regularly changing,
anonymous identification numbers, which are recorded and stored by other devices using the DP-3T
app in the surrounding area (proximity contacts). App users with SARS-CoV-2–positive test results
can trigger exposure notifications to their proximity contacts in a privacy-preserving manner by
entering an upload authorization code in the DCT app.
In principle, DCT has several advantages over MCT. First, app users with SARS-CoV-2–positive
test results do not have to rely on memory to recall proximity contacts. Second, once the app user
enters the upload authorization code, notification happens almost in real time and simultaneously for
all proximity contacts, without requiring human resources.4 Although detailed quantification and
contextualization of the effects of DCT apps are warranted, early analyses based on routine
monitoring data demonstrated proof-of-principle that DCT can work as intended. A study by Salathé
et al5 showed that from July to September 2020, 65 persons in Switzerland had positive test results
after an app notification (0.8% of 7842 reports containing information on reasons for testing).
Furthermore, early population-level data were provided by studies from the Isle of Wight,6 and more
recently from England and Wales.7 Based on statistical modeling of regional heterogeneity of app
uptake and local incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection, the latter study estimated the number of cases
averted by successful app notification to range from 200 000 to 900 000 for November and
December 2020.7
Focusing on the situation in Switzerland, our analysis had 2 aims. First, by combining data from
different sources, we sought to describe the different steps in the notification cascade and to
quantify the population in each step for a clearly defined regional and temporal context. Second,
building on these results, we identified and estimated possible indicators to advance our
understanding of the role of DCT vis-a-vis MCT. The analysis was conducted during a period of a
marked increase in the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection, which brought MCT, testing laboratories,
and health facilities in some areas to capacity limits. Therefore, our study also enabled a closer
analysis of how potential health system bottlenecks may affect the notification cascade.
Methods
Because this was a comparative effectiveness study based on aggregate data, it was exempt from
requiring ethical approval under the Swiss Human Research Act. Informed consent was obtained
from all participants in the COVID-19 Social Monitor8 and the Zurich SARS-CoV-2 Cohort9 studies
contributing aggregated data for this analysis. The reporting and discussion of evidence follow the
International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) reporting guideline
where applicable.10
Description of DCT Exposure Notification Cascade
A detailed description of the steps necessary for warning proximity contacts through DCT apps (the
notification cascade)11 and parameterizations12 are provided elsewhere. Figure 1 illustrates the
notification cascade in Switzerland. In brief, users of the SwissCovid DCT app with positive test
results for SARS-CoV-2 must request an upload authorization code (“CovidCode”) from cantonal
public health authorities (or, more recently, from physicians and testing centers). Entering the upload
authorization code into the app will lead to a central server upload of all identification numbers that
were broadcast within the time window of infectiousness. Other DCT apps periodically download the
list of infectious identification numbers and match this list with the locally stored encounter
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identification numbers. The matching procedure takes proximity and time of the exposure into
account and triggers an exposure notification if predefined thresholds (proximity of 1.5 m to an
infected person for 15 minutes) are reached.
In Switzerland, notified app users are instructed to call an information hotline (hereinafter
referred to as the infoline). The infoline staff will then determine whether a (voluntary) quarantine is
warranted. Notified app users are also eligible for a free SARS-CoV-2 test, independent of an infoline
call. Thus, the effectiveness of the app in stopping transmission chains strongly depends on the
actions taken by notified app users to prevent further possible transmissions, such as entering
quarantine.2,4
Setting
We analyzed data collected from September 1 to October 31, 2020. As shown in Figure 2, the daily
incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in Switzerland was relatively stable, at 300 to 600 new cases in
September, followed by an increase in October to 10 000 cases and a decrease in November.13
Figure 2 further shows the number of entered upload authorization codes and infoline calls, which
largely followed the trajectory of SARS-CoV-2 infection incidence. However, upload authorization
codes and infoline call curves crossed in October, caused by high call volumes leading to a temporary
overload at the infoline call center. There were also delays in issuing upload authorization codes for
app users with positive test results, which have been documented by an increasing time from
symptom onset to upload of authorization codes.14 Owing to these capacity issues, the analysis for
the month of October was conducted for 2 separate periods (October 1-15 and 16-31, 2020). The
primary study focus was the notification cascade in the canton of Zurich, which has 1.5 million
inhabitants (compared with 8.6 million inhabitants in Switzerland overall). Zurich was selected owing
to the availability of several relevant data sources from public health administration and research.15,16
Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the Digital Contact Tracing Notification Cascade
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537 (95% SI, 372-703) App users
(of 1923 overall with positive test result)
Step 2
324 (95% SI, 252-394) CovidCodes
received and entered
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The notification cascade of the SwissCovid digital contact tracing app consists of the
following steps: (1) An infected person A (index case) has a positive test result for SARS-
CoV-2 (red), is referred to manual contact tracing (MCT), and (2) receives and uploads
an authorization code (CovidCode) to warn other app users. Person B (exposed
proximity contact) was in close proximity. (3) This person who receives the app
notification has several options: (4) calling an information hotline (infoline;
recommended option), (5) receiving a free test, and/or (6) voluntary quarantine. (7)
Some persons will have a positive test result after app notification, who will then be
placed in isolation by manual contact tracing. The different populations at each step
were calculated using data triangulation and stochastic simulation, as described in Table
2. The numbers reflect simulation results for the canton of Zurich from September 1 to
September 30, 2020 (first data column in Table 3); 95% simulation intervals (SIs) are
calculated as 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of 50 000 simulations.
JAMA Network Open | Public Health Exposure Notification Cascade for Digital SARS-CoV-2 Contact Tracing
JAMA Network Open. 2021;4(4):e218184. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.8184 (Reprinted) April 30, 2021 3/11
Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Universitaetsbibliothek Bern User  on 05/05/2021
Data Sources
Key epidemiological data on use of the SwissCovid DCT app and indicators of app effectiveness were
extracted from various sources (eMethods in the Supplement). Data are summarized in Table 1 for
both Zurich and Switzerland overall.
Calculation Method
This study used a triangulation of measured data,17 combined with stochastic simulations to explore
the robustness of estimates. The triangulation process followed the framework of Kaufmann et al.18
Key outcome measures were defined as described in Table 2, a list of possible administrative and
research data sources was compiled, data sources were screened for relevant information, and
suitable parameter data were extracted. Next, a schematic model for the notification cascade was
defined, outlining the flow of users and information (Figure 1) analogous to the model presented
elsewhere.5
For the first study aim, respective population sizes were calculated for each step in the
notification cascade, based on measured data and estimated parameters (Table 2). In addition, the
following complementary performance indicators were defined for the second study aim:
• Fraction of entered upload authorization codes per app users with positive SARS-CoV-2 results.
• Ratio of notified app users per entered upload authorization codes.
• Ratio of entered upload authorization codes per app users with positive test results after app
notification.
• Ratio of the number of infoline callers receiving a quarantine recommendation to the number of all
quarantined persons.
• Ratio of infoline calls per entered upload authorization codes.
• Ratio of persons with positive test results on app notification per all cases positive for SARS-CoV-2.
The triangulation was performed separately for the 3 different periods (all of September and
the first and second halves of October) both for Zurich and for Switzerland overall. It centered around
2 key indicators, for which measured data were available: the number of infoline calls from Zurich
(cascade step 4, parameter 4A) and the number of positive test results following an app notification
in Zurich (step 7, parameter 7A; note that the measure is likely an underestimation5). The
triangulation process consisted of a size estimation of the remaining 5 subpopulations in the
notification cascade. For estimated parameters (Table 1), uncertainty ranges were either based on
95% CIs if parameters were derived from individual-level data or by adding a 4% to 10% margin
around the best available data point if derived from aggregated data (with margin adjustment during
the triangulation process described below).
Figure 2. Evolution of Key Statistics in Switzerland for the Months of September and October 2020













New SARS-CoV-2 cases Upload authorization codes Calls to infoline
Jagged lines are numbers from daily reporting, and
smooth lines reflect 7-day moving mean numbers.
Vertical blue lines mark cutoff dates for the different
time strata used in the analysis. Infoline indicates
information hotline.
JAMA Network Open | Public Health Exposure Notification Cascade for Digital SARS-CoV-2 Contact Tracing
JAMA Network Open. 2021;4(4):e218184. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.8184 (Reprinted) April 30, 2021 4/11
Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Universitaetsbibliothek Bern User  on 05/05/2021
Based on the parameters and uncertainty ranges, a stochastic simulation with 50 000
repetitions was performed, whereby all parameter values were drawn at random from uniform
parameter distributions defined by prespecified parameter limits (Table 1). The estimated sizes of the
5 subpopulations in the cascade and the performance indicators were summarized as medians with
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, including 95% of all estimates, for parameter estimates across all
simulations (95% simulation interval [SI]). The simulation results were systematically checked for
consistency based on the following criteria (in descending order of priority):
1. Is the estimate consistent with independently collected analogous data?
2. Does the estimate contradict other upstream or downstream estimates?
3. Are the estimates largely consistent with qualitative information if available?
In case of inconsistencies, the simulation was iteratively refined by adjusting the uncertainty ranges.
Calculations were performed in R, version 3.6.2 (R Program for Statistical Computing).19
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2A No. of entered upload
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of Switzerland
NA NA NA 1867 2916 12 453 Swiss Federal
Office of
Statistics14
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2B alternative Fraction of new cases
measured from Zurich, %
16.8 16.6 13.2 NA NA NA Swiss Federal
Office of Public
Health13
3A No. of measured calls to
infoline after app
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722 1289 3091 2430 3696 9889 Swiss Federal
Office of
Statistics14
3B Notified users calling
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measured after app
notificationc
722 1289 3091 2430 3696 9889 Swiss Federal
Office of
Statistics14
5A Measured fraction of
positive test results among
all tests performed, %
3.2 9.4 15.8 3.6 10.9 23.8 Swiss Federal
Office of Public
Health13



































Abbreviations: NA, not applicable; ZSAC, Zurich SARS-CoV-2 Cohort Study.
a Indicates fraction of Swiss population of 8.6 million.
b Uncertainty range includes national mean based on parameter 1A; estimate from
COVID-19 Social Monitor of 37%.
c Same as parameter 3A.
d Underreporting by 37% for all of Switzerland in September5 and likely higher in
October 2020.
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Results
First, the population sizes at the different notification cascade steps were estimated. Figure 1 and
eFigures 1 and 2 in the Supplement show subpopulation sizes of the individual cascade steps for
Zurich in September 2020. Based on our simulations, 537 of 1923 persons (27.9%) with SARS-CoV-2–
positive test results were app users and presumably received an upload authorization code. Of those,
324 (60.3%) entered an upload authorization code, which triggered exposure notifications in 1374
exposed proximity contacts. These notifications led to 722 persons calling the infoline, of whom 170
(23.5%) received a quarantine recommendation. Furthermore, 30 (95% SI, 23-36) app users had
SARS-CoV-2–positive test results after receiving the app notification (3.2% of an estimated 939 [95%
SI, 720-1127] notified persons undergoing testing).
Analogous calculations for the month of October and all of Switzerland are shown in Table 3
(upper half). As demonstrated in Figure 2 and Table 1 (second row), the number of SARS-CoV-2–
positive cases in each period rose substantially in the first and second half of October in Zurich (from
1923 cases in September to 3736 and 13 185 cases in the first and second halves of October,
respectively) and all of Switzerland (from 11 463 in September to 22 555 and 100 057 cases in the first
and second halves of October, respectively). The absolute sizes of subpopulations in the notification
cascade also grew markedly from September to October. The estimated number of entered upload
authorization codes in Zurich increased from 324 (95% SI, 252-394) to 1426 (95% SI, 951-1896) from
September to the second half of October; the number of infoline calls, from 722 to 3091; and the
estimated number of quarantine recommendations, from 170 (95% SI, 154-186) to 711 (95% SI, 643-
778).
Additional analyses of complementary performance indicators aiming to compare and evaluate
the changes in subpopulation sizes with respect to the dynamics of the pandemic suggest that the
number of entered upload authorization codes did not grow proportionally to the number of new
cases of SARS-CoV-2, as shown in the lower half of Table 3. In Zurich, the fraction of entered upload
authorization codes per app user with positive findings for SARS-CoV-2 changed from 60.3% (95%
SI, 39.5%-96.5%) in September to 40.4% (95% SI, 25.3%-66.0%) in the first half of October and
37.3% (95% SI, 22.2%-60.5%) in the second half of October. The corresponding numbers for all of
Switzerland were 58.3% (95% SI, 44.5%-84.5%) in September, 46.3% (95% SI, 35.3%-66.8%) in the
first half of October, and 43.0% (95% SI, 34.0%-58.5%) in the second half of October.
Longitudinal indicator changes were also observed for the ratio of the number of infoline callers
receiving a quarantine recommendation to the number of all quarantined persons, which declined
from 5.1% (95% SI, 4.6%-5.6%) to 3.1% (95% SI, 2.8%-3.4%) in Zurich, whereas the nationwide ratio
for Switzerland remained stable at 2.0% (95% SI, 1.8%-2.2%). Similarly, the ratio of app users with
positive test results after an app notification to all persons with new positive test results changed





1 No. of app users with test
results positive for
SARS-CoV-2
No. of positive cases [1B] × fraction of app users in Swiss
population [1A]
2 No. of uploaded authorization
codes entered in app
No. of total upload authorization codes entered in Switzerland
[2A] × percentage of logins into upload authorization code
generation software by Zurich as a proxy for code generation [2B]
(alternative: fraction of positive cases from Zurich [2B alt])
3 No. of persons notified by app No. of infoline calls [4A]/percentage of persons calling the infoline
among all persons notified by the app [3B]
4 No. of infoline calls related to
app exposure notifications
No. of infoline calls [4A]
5 No. of tests performed after
an app notification
No. of positive test results at app notification [7A]/percentage of
positive tests among all tests performed [5A]b
6 No. of infoline calls leading to
quarantine recommendation
No. of infoline calls [4A] × percentage of calls leading to
quarantine recommendation [6A]
7 No. of positive test results
after app notification
No. of positive test results where test was performed after app
notification [7A]
a Numbers in brackets refer to parameter
identification in Table 1.
b The overall test positivity rate is likely an
underestimation of the true positivity for persons
with digital proximity contact exposure.
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from 1.6% (95% SI, 1.2%-1.9%) to 0.6% (95% SI, 0.5%-0.7%) in Zurich and from 0.6% (95% SI,
0.5%-0.7%) to 0.2% (95% SI, 0.1%-0.2%) in Switzerland. Similar dynamics were mirrored by the
ratio of entered upload authorization codes per app users with positive test results on app
notification. In Zurich, for every 10.9 (95% SI, 7.6-15.6) entered upload authorization codes, there
was 1 positive test result after notification in September. This ratio decreased to 6.2 (95% SI, 4.2-9.3)
in the first half of October, then increased to 18.4 (95% SI, 11.2-35.2) in the second half of October.
The nationwide ratio for Switzerland showed a similar dynamic, but the nationwide ratios were 3 to 4
times higher than the ratios for Zurich (27.9 [95% SI, 22.8-35.2] entered upload authorization codes




The present study provides a first estimation of the contribution of the DCT app to mitigating SARS-
CoV-2 transmission in the canton of Zurich. During a period of relatively stable SARS-CoV-2 infection
incidence in September 2020, we found that app notifications may have contributed to actions to
prevent further viral transmission in 30 infected persons who underwent testing for SARS-CoV-2.
Furthermore, we estimated that app notifications led to quarantine recommendations in 170
exposed contact persons. Overall, this estimate implies that the app could have led, at most, to a 5%
increase of persons entering quarantine. However, the effort to identify these persons likely was less
Table 3. Quantification of the Digital Contact Tracing App Notification Cascade and Estimation of Monitoring Parameters
Outcome
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Abbreviations: NA, not applicable; SI simulation interval.
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labor and resource intensive for DCT than for MCT. Of note, the data from Zurich suggest an above-
average performance of the app notification cascade when compared with DCT indicators for all of
Switzerland. Therefore, the results of our study suggest that DCT may have a role as a
complementary measure to identify cases of infection and mitigate the spread of SARS-CoV-2.
The month of September was followed by a 20- to 30-fold increase in the incidence of SARS-
CoV-2 infection by the end of October, which led to temporary capacity issues for MCT, infoline call
centers, and the generation of upload authorization codes. Moreover, only 2 of 3 generated upload
authorization codes are eventually entered by users in a timely manner.5 These cascade bottlenecks
were also reflected by a deterioration of most outcome indicators monitored by our study.
Nevertheless, the rising incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection also had positive consequences for the
adaptation and process efficiency of the DCT technology. From mid-August to mid-October 2020,
the number of active app users in Switzerland plateaued at 1.6 million. Renewed public appeals by
health authorities for using the app resulted in 200 000 additional users by the end of October.14
Moreover, important bottlenecks in the notification cascade, most especially the capacity of the
infoline and the process for issuing upload authorization codes, were identified as a result of the
increased incidence of infection. This led to the swift implementation of specific measures to
improve DCT processes, such as technical solutions to handle higher call volumes and to automatize
upload authorization code generation, as well as introducing the possibility for any physician and
testing center to issue upload authorization codes if the cantonal health authorities are unable to
respond in a timely manner.
Furthermore, cantonal public health authorities scaled up MCT by hiring more personnel and
automated different steps in contact tracing through an online form for index cases and close
contacts. Although the effects of these changes became fully visible after the conclusion of our
analysis, some indicators from official statistics already suggested a recovery in the notification
cascade performance. By November, the nationwide mean time from symptom onset to upload
authorization codes entry decreased to approximately 4 days after a mean of 5 days in late October.14
Furthermore, owing to the introduction of rapid antigen testing at easily accessible sites (eg,
including 40 pharmacies in Zurich), this interval is expected to have decreased further. These
examples underscore the need for a continuous, comprehensive evaluation of the full DCT
notification cascade, but also for a fast adjustment of processes and increase in resources in case of
capacity bottlenecks. In addition, increased automation of the different steps in the notification
cascade may help to achieve better performance. For example, DCT systems in Germany and
Belgium have automated the registration and communication of SARS-CoV-2 test results or the
upload of temporary exposure keys of infected persons, while still obtaining explicit app user consent
for these steps.20,21 Similar optimizations are underway in Zurich.
Strengths and Limitations
To our knowledge, our study is one of first systematic attempts to longitudinally quantify and
evaluate the performance of the DCT app notification cascade. Our study is based on the premise
that DCT apps represent a complex intervention that depends on the actions of app users and other
players within a health system. A media analysis from Switzerland22 previously reported on
implementation challenges for DCT, including delays in the provision of upload authorization codes
to app users with positive test results. Our study confirms these observations and presents indicators
for a more targeted monitoring of specific procedures along the notification cascade that pose
potential bottlenecks.
The calculation methods and indicators used in this study for monitoring DCT performance do
not require individual-level data and are thus fully compatible with the privacy-preserving design and
philosophy of DP-3T. However, this is also a limitation. For example, the increased incidence of
SARS-CoV-2 infections in the second half of October also affected the data collection procedures for
monitoring statistics. For example, the reporting of the reasons for testing (such as a DCT app
notification), which primarily relies on physicians diagnosing the infection, was already incomplete in
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September but nearly stopped toward the end of October 2020. This underreporting also may have
led to the underestimation of some indicators in our analysis (eg, the number of persons with positive
test results after app notification). However, we partly accounted for this issue through the
performance of stochastic analyses and the presentation of uncertainty ranges.
Furthermore, some of the parameter estimates used in our calculations were derived from
studies with limited sample sizes and follow-up (eg, the Zurich SARS-CoV-2 Cohort Study). Other
parameters were only available on a national level, which may not reflect canton-specific differences
adequately (eg, process efficiency of upload authorization code provision or MCT). These
imprecisions are also reflected by the relatively wide uncertainty ranges of some parameters.
However, we found no indications for systematic biases (eTable in the Supplement). To obtain more
precise results involving fewer assumptions, more granular and more regionally differentiated data
from ongoing research studies are essential.
Conclusions
By evaluating the population at each step of the DCT notification cascade for Zurich and all of
Switzerland, this simulation study provides one of the first estimations, to our knowledge, of the
contributions of DCT apps to mitigating the pandemic. Our data suggest that the number of
app-notified persons receiving a quarantine recommendation corresponds to the equivalent of as
many as 5% of all mandatory quarantined contacts identified by MCT. Furthermore, we estimate that
1 in 10.9 persons who entered upload authorization codes led to SARS-CoV-2 testing of an exposed
proximity contact who subsequently received a positive test result. Promoting use of the app,
increasing automation of the DCT notification cascade, and connecting rapid antigen testing with
DCT—while maintaining the privacy-preserving and voluntary nature of DCT—could further enhance
the speed of the notification cascade and increase compliance of exposure-notified app users.
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